Thesmos Phos
All laws
Ν. 66(Ι)/1997

Business of Credit Institutions Laws 1997 to 2000

Οι περί Εργασιών Πιστωτικών Ιδρυμάτων Νόμοι του 1997 έως 2000

Contents
  1. 1.Short title
  2. 2.Interpretation
  3. 2Α.Definitions: financial institutions and subsidiaries
  4. 2Β.Definitions: consolidation and parent undertakings
  5. 2Γ.Definitions: capital instruments and own funds
  6. 3.Prohibition on taking deposits
  7. 4.Operating licence
  8. 4Α.Revocation of operating licence
  9. 4Β.Bridge institution licence
  10. 4Γ.Approval of financial holding companies
  11. 4Δ.Intermediate EU parent undertaking
  12. 4Ε.Specific requirements for certain credit institutions
  13. 4ΣΤ.Licensing fees
  14. 5.Restrictions on use of "bank" name
  15. 6.Advertising
  16. 7.Place of business outside the Republic
  17. 8.Representative offices
  18. 9.Termination of branch operations
  19. 10.Change of memorandum or articles of association
  20. 10Α.Activities via branch or services from other Member States (passporting in)
  21. 10Β.Host Member State branch supervision
  22. 10Βδις.Financial institution passporting activities
  23. 10Γ.Republic ACI establishing a branch in another Member State
  24. 10Γδις.Republic ACI as parent of a financial institution carrying on cross-border activities
  25. 10Δ.Enforcement against branches of EU credit institutions violating this Law
  26. 10Ε.Precautionary measures in emergency
  27. 10ΣΤ.Revocation — host Member State notification
  28. 10Ζ.Third-country branches
  29. 12.Auditors
  30. 14.Minimum requirements
  31. 15.Corporate governance and remuneration
  32. 16.Publication of information
  33. 17.Assessment of proposed acquisitions
  34. 17Α.Assessment criteria for acquisitions
  35. 17Β.Consultation with other competent authorities
  36. 17Γ.Notification of disposals
  37. 17Δ.Information and sanctions for acquisition or disposal
  38. 17Ε.Assessment of acquisitions in the context of bail-in or conversion
  39. 17ΣΤ.Expeditious examination in connection with resolution sale
  40. 17Ζ.Derogation for sale of business tool
  41. 18.Management body fitness and disqualifications
  42. 19.Corporate governance framework
  43. 19Α.Internal capital adequacy assessment (ICAAP)
  44. 19Β.Board independence and senior management oversight
  45. 19Γ.Internal ratings and credit risk models
  46. 19Δ.Benchmark portfolio reporting
  47. 19Ε.Application of ICAAP on individual and consolidated basis
  48. 19ΣΤ.Governance on individual and consolidated basis
  49. 22Γ.Distribution restrictions where combined buffer requirement not met (MDA)
  50. 22Γδις.Definition of failure to meet combined buffer requirement
  51. Leverage ratio buffer restrictions
  52. Definition of failure to meet leverage ratio buffer requirement
  53. 22Δ.Capital conservation plan
  54. Adequate authorised capital for bail-in
  55. Sale of MREL-eligible instruments to retail clients
  56. 22Ε.Liquidity risk profile
  57. 23.Liquid assets minimum ratio
  58. 23Α.Recovery plans
  59. 23Β.Assessment of recovery plans
  60. 23Γ.Group recovery plans
  61. 23Δ.Joint assessment of group recovery plans
  62. 23Ε.Recovery plan indicators
  63. 23ΣΤ.Proportionality in recovery planning
  64. 23Ζ.Intragroup financial support agreements
  65. 23Η.Conditions for intragroup financial support
  66. 23Θ.Authorisation of financial support agreements
  67. 23Ι.Shareholder approval of financial support agreements
  68. 23ΙΑ.Notification to resolution authorities
  69. 23ΙΒ.Decision to provide support
  70. 23ΙΓ.Prior notification of anticipated support
  71. 23ΙΔ.Disclosure obligations
  72. 23ΙΕ.Exchange of information with resolution authorities
  73. 23ΙΣΤ.Group resolution plan opinions
  74. 23ΙΖ.Cooperation arrangements with third-country authorities
  75. 23ΙΗ.Conditions for sharing confidential information with third-country authorities
  76. 23ΙΘ.Cooperation with EBA
  77. 24.Annual accounts
  78. 24Α.Country-by-country reporting
  79. 24Β.Return on assets
  80. 25.Periodic reporting and information requirements
  81. 25Α.Waivers and exemptions
  82. 26.Supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP)
  83. 26A.Transparency of requirements and supervisory data
  84. 26Β.Disclosure regarding own funds discretions
  85. 26Γ.Collection of diversity and remuneration data
  86. 26Δ.Gender pay gap and limits on variable remuneration
  87. 26Ε.Supervisory review programme
  88. 26ΣΤ.Annual stress tests
  89. 26Ζ.Review of internal risk-assessment approaches
  90. 26Θ.Liquidity requirements
  91. 26Ι.Application of the review and supervisory measures according to the level of application of the Regulation
  92. 26ΙΑ.Informing the EBA for the purposes of convergence of supervisory practices
  93. 26ΙΒ.Cooperation with host supervisors on significant branches
  94. 27.Supervisory cooperation and consolidated supervision
  95. 27Α.Article 27Α
  96. 27Β.Article 27Β
  97. 27Γ.Article 27Γ
  98. 27Γδις.Article 27Γδις
  99. 27Δ.Article 27Δ
  100. 27Ε.Cooperation in supervisory reviews
  101. 27ΣΤ.Supervisory colleges — operation
  102. 27Ζ.General information sharing within colleges
  103. 27Η.ESRB and EBA notifications
  104. 28.Professional secrecy
  105. 28Α.Disclosure in winding-up civil proceedings
  106. 28Β.Permissible purposes for use of received information
  107. 28Βδις.Additional permissible purposes
  108. 28Γ.Exchanges with competent authorities of other Member States
  109. 28Δ.Information from other public authorities
  110. 28Ε.Exchange with DGS and resolution authorities
  111. 28ΣΤ.Exchange of information in cross-border supervision
  112. 28Ζ.Information sharing with oversight bodies
  113. 29.Criminal offences: unauthorised deposit-taking
  114. 29Α.Article 29Α
  115. 30.Article 30
  116. 30δις.Additional supervisory measures
  117. 30τρις.Intragroup transaction monitoring
  118. 30τετρ.Remuneration restrictions
  119. 30Α.Article 30Α
  120. 30Γ.Article 30Γ
  121. 30Δ.Article 30Δ
  122. 30Ε.Article 30Ε
  123. 30ΣΤ.Group-level supervisory measures
  124. 31.Prohibition on use of ACI name after licence revocation
  125. 32.Winding up
  126. 32Α.CBC powers in winding-up proceedings
  127. 32Β.Management body obligation to notify insolvency
  128. 32Γ.Preferential claims of depositors
  129. 32Δ.Write-down and conversion powers
  130. 32Ε.Notification and publication of write-down and conversion decisions
  131. 32ΣΤ.Consolidated application and determination procedure
  132. 32Ζ.Records of financial contracts
  133. 32Η.Assessment of individual resolvability
  134. 32Θ.Assessment of group resolvability
  135. 32ΙΒ.General principles for cross-border resolution decisions
  136. 32ΙΓ.Compliance with EU resolution technical standards
  137. 32ΙΔ.Restriction on insolvency proceedings during resolution
  138. 33.Reorganisation measures
  139. 33δις.Reorganisation plan — bail-in
  140. 33Α.Liquidation proceedings
  141. 33Β.Dissolution and appointment of liquidator
  142. 33Βδις.Special liquidation of ACI
  143. 33Γ.Notification of winding-up decision to other Member States
  144. 33Δ.Voluntary liquidation
  145. 33Ε.Commencement of winding-up proceedings
  146. 33Ζ.Publication of winding-up decision
  147. 33Η.Effects of winding-up on employment contracts and immovable property rights
  148. 33Θ.Third-party rights in rem
  149. 33Ι.Retention of title
  150. 33Κ.Set-off
  151. 33Λ.Protection of third parties — post-reorganisation transactions
  152. 33Μ.Certificate of appointment of liquidator from another Member State
  153. 33Ν.Powers of liquidator exercised in other Member States
  154. 33Ξ.Dissolution of covered bond issuer
  155. 33Ο.Ranking of claims in insolvency
  156. 34.Provision of information to the DGS Management Committee
  157. 39.Consolidated supervision — allocation and scope
  158. 39A.Article 39A
  159. 39Β.Article 39B
  160. 39Γ.Article 39Γ
  161. 39Δ.Article 39D
  162. 39Ε.Article 39E
  163. 39ΣΤ.Article 39ΣΤ
  164. 40.Article 40
  165. 41.Οδηγίες της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (Directives of the Central Bank)
  166. 41Α.Μηχανισμοί καταγγελίας παραβάσεων (Mechanisms for reporting breaches)
  167. 41Β.Εξουσίες παρέμβασης της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (Powers of intervention of the Central Bank)
  168. 41Γ.Κυρώσεις και εξουσίες διερεύνησης (Sanctions and investigatory powers)
  169. 41Δ.Specific infringements attracting mandatory sanctions
  170. 41Ε.Criteria for determining sanctions
  171. 41ΣΤ.Sanctions for failures relating to recovery plans
  172. 42.Administrative measures — non-compliance with directives and requirements
  173. 42Α.Administrative fine for breach of SEPA Regulation
  174. 42Β.Publication of administrative sanctions
  175. 42Γ.Reporting of sanctions to EBA
  176. 42Δ.Right of appeal against sanctions
  177. 43.Criminal penalties for breach of the Law
  178. 44.Prosecution of criminal offences
  179. 47.Extended remediation period for asset disposal issues
  180. 47Α.Application of directives to cooperative credit institutions
  181. 47Β.Transitional — approval of existing financial holding companies
  182. 48.Repeal
  183. 49.Replacement of "Central Bank" as reorganisation authority
  184. 50.Effective date for Articles 51 to 56
  185. 51.Periodic reports from EU credit institution branches
  186. 52.Host Member State reporting obligations
  187. 53.Emergency precautionary measures by host Member State
  188. 54.Allocation of prudential supervision responsibilities
  189. 55.Cooperation on cross-border banking supervision
  190. 56.Significant branches — determination and supervisory cooperation
  191. 57.On-site examination of branches

Article 17Α

Original source · 2026-09-17

▶Show summary

In brief

This article sets out the criteria by which the Central Bank assesses the suitability of a proposed acquirer of a qualifying holding in an LCI and the soundness of the proposed transaction.

What the law establishes

The Central Bank assesses: the reputation of the proposed acquirer; the reputation, knowledge and experience of the future managers of the LCI; the financial soundness of the acquirer; whether the LCI will continue to be able to comply with prudential supervision requirements; and the money laundering/terrorist financing risks connected with the transaction. The Central Bank may oppose the acquisition only on reasonable grounds under these criteria, or if the information provided is incomplete; it may not impose prior conditions on the size of the holding or assess the transaction from the standpoint of market needs. The Bank publishes a list of the information required and must treat all competing proposed acquirers of the same LCI without discrimination.

In practice

The regulator cannot refuse to approve a transaction arbitrarily — only on the basis of transparent criteria (reputation, finances, AML/CFT risk) and only where it has solid grounds to do so.

▶Show full text

(1) The Central Bank shall assess the notification submitted pursuant to subsection (1) of article and the information referred to in subsection (3) of article , in order to ensure the sound and prudent management of the LCI in which the acquisition of a holding is proposed and, taking into account the likely influence of the proposed acquirer on the LCI, shall assess the suitability of the proposed acquirer and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition in accordance with the following criteria:

(a) the reputation of the proposed acquirer;

(b) the reputation, knowledge, skills and experience, as defined in the 2014 Directive on the Assessment of the Fitness and Properness of Members of the Management Body and Directors of Licensed Credit Institutions, of any member of the management body who will direct the business of the LCI following the proposed acquisition;

(c) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, in particular in relation to the type of business pursued or envisaged to be pursued by the LCI in respect of which the acquisition is proposed;

(d) whether the LCI will be able to comply and continue to comply with the prudential supervision requirements under this Law, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and, as applicable, European Union law and the Cypriot provisions harmonising therewith, and in particular the Electronic Money Law and the 2012 Directive on the Supplementary Supervision of Banks belonging to a Financial Conglomerate, in particular whether the group of which it will become part has a structure that makes it possible to exercise effective supervision, to effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and to determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities; and

(e) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing, within the meaning of article of the Law on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering Activities, is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase such risk.

(2) The Central Bank may oppose the proposed acquisition of a holding only if there are reasonable grounds for doing so on the basis of the criteria set out in subsection , or if the information provided by the proposed acquirer is incomplete.

(3) The Central Bank shall not impose any prior conditions as to the level of the holding to be acquired, nor shall it examine the proposed acquisition of a holding in terms of the economic needs of the market.

(4) The Central Bank shall publish a list of the information necessary to carry out the assessment, which shall be provided to it at the time of the notification provided for in subsection (1) of article . The information required shall be proportionate and adapted to the nature of the proposed acquirer and of the proposed acquisition of a holding: Provided that the Central Bank shall not require information that is not relevant to the prudential assessment.

(5) Notwithstanding subsections (2), (3) and (4) of article , where two or more proposals to acquire a qualifying holding or to increase a qualifying holding in the same LCI are notified to the Central Bank, the Central Bank shall treat all proposed acquirers in a non-discriminatory manner.

▶Original (Greek)

(1) Η Κεντρική Τράπεζα αξιολογεί τη γνωστοποίηση που υποβάλλεται σύμφωνα με το εδάφιο (1) του άρθρου και τις πληροφορίες που αναφέρονται στο εδάφιο (3) του άρθρου , προκειμένου να διασφαλίσει την ορθή και συνετή διοίκηση του ΑΠΙ για το οποίο προτείνεται η απόκτηση συμμετοχής και λαμβάνοντας υπόψη την ενδεχόμενη επιρροή από τον υποψήφιου αγοραστή στο ΑΠΙ, αξιολογεί την καταλληλότητα του υποψήφιου αγοραστή και την ορθότητα της προτεινόμενης απόκτησης από χρηματοοικονομική άποψη, σύμφωνα με τα ακόλουθα κριτήρια:

(α) τη φήμη του υποψήφιου αγοραστή (β) τη φήμη, τη γνώση, τις δεξιότητες και την πείρα, όπως ορίζονται στην περί της Αξιολόγησης της Ικανότητας και Καταλληλότητας Μελών του Διοικητικού Οργάνου και των Διευθυντών των Αδειοδοτημένων Πιστωτικών Ιδρυμάτων Οδηγία του 2014, οποιουδήποτε μέλους του διοικητικού οργάνου το οποίο θα κατευθύνει τις δραστηριότητες του ΑΠΙ κατόπιν της προτεινόμενης απόκτησης (γ) τη χρηματοοικονομική ευρωστία του υποψήφιου αγοραστή, ιδίως ως προς το είδος των δραστηριοτήτων που ασκούνται ή προβλέπεται ότι θα ασκούνται από το ΑΠΙ για την οποία προτείνεται η εν λόγω απόκτηση (δ) την ικανότητα του ΑΠΙ να συμμορφώνεται και να συνεχίσει να συμμορφώνεται με τις απαιτήσεις προληπτικής εποπτείας βάσει του παρόντος Νόμου, του Κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 575/2013 και, κατά περίπτωση, βάσει του ενωσιακού δικαίου και των κυπριακών εναρμονιστικών διατάξεων με αυτό και κυρίως του περί Ηλεκτρονικού Χρήματος Νόμου και της περί της Συμπληρωματικής Εποπτείας Τραπεζών που ανήκουν σε Χρηματοπιστωτικό Όμιλο Ετερογενών Δραστηριοτήτων Οδηγίας του 2012, ιδίως κατά πόσον ο όμιλος του οποίου θα καταστεί μέλος διαθέτει τέτοια δομή που καθιστά δυνατή την άσκηση αποτελεσματικής εποπτείας, την αποτελεσματική ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών μεταξύ των αρμόδιων αρχών και τον προσδιορισμό της κατανομής των αρμοδιοτήτων μεταξύ των αρμόδιων αρχών και (ε) κατά πόσον υπάρχουν βάσιμες υπόνοιες ότι, σε σχέση με την προτεινόμενη απόκτηση, διαπράττεται, επιχειρείται να διαπραχθεί, έχει διαπραχθεί ή επιχειρήθηκε να διαπραχθεί νομιμοποίηση εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες ή χρηματοδότηση της τρομοκρατίας, κατά την έννοια του άρθρου του περί της Παρεμπόδισης και Καταπολέμησης της Νομιμοποίησης Εσόδων από Παράνομες Δραστηριότητες Νόμου, ή ότι η προτεινόμενη απόκτηση είναι δυνατόν να αυξήσει αυτό τον κίνδυνο.

(2) Η Κεντρική Τράπεζα δύναται να αντιταχθεί στην προτεινόμενη απόκτηση συμμετοχής μόνον εφόσον υπάρχουν βάσιμοι λόγοι για αυτό με βάση τα κριτήρια του εδαφίου ή εάν οι πληροφορίες που διαβιβάσθηκαν από τον υποψήφιο αγοραστή δεν είναι πλήρεις.

(3) Η Κεντρική Τράπεζα δεν επιβάλλει εκ των προτέρων όρους όσον αφορά το ύψος της συμμετοχής που πρέπει να αποκτηθεί, ούτε εξετάζει την προτεινόμενη απόκτηση συμμετοχής από πλευράς οικονομικών αναγκών της αγοράς.

(4) Η Κεντρική Τράπεζα δημοσιοποιεί κατάλογο με τις αναγκαίες πληροφορίες για τη διενέργεια της αξιολόγησης, οι οποίες πρέπει να υποβάλλονται στην ίδια κατά τη στιγμή της κοινοποίησης που προβλέπεται στο εδάφιο (1) του άρθρου . Οι απαιτούμενες πληροφορίες πρέπει να είναι ανάλογες και προσαρμοσμένες στη φύση του υποψηφίου αγοραστή και της προτεινόμενης απόκτησης συμμετοχής: Νοείται ότι, η Κεντρική Τράπεζα δεν απαιτεί πληροφορίες που δεν είναι σχετικές με την προληπτική αξιολόγηση.

(5) Ανεξάρτητα από τα εδάφια (2), (3) και (4) του άρθρου , σε περίπτωση που κοινοποιηθούν στην Κεντρική Τράπεζα δύο ή περισσότερες προτάσεις για απόκτηση ειδικής συμμετοχής ή αύξηση ειδικής συμμετοχής στο ίδιο ΑΠΙ, η Κεντρική Τράπεζα αντιμετωπίζει όλους τους υποψήφιους αγοραστές αμερόληπτα.

This information is for general guidance only and is not legal advice. Check the primary source and consult a lawyer where necessary.